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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Steven Chambers entered a conditional Alford1 plea to
battery with intent to commit a serious felony, reserving the right to appeal the district court’s
decision regarding evidence related to the complaining witness’ subsequent false allegation of
rape against another male. 2 The district court imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with two
years fixed, and placed Mr. Chambers on supervised probation for three years. Mr. Chambers
appealed, asserting the district court erred by excluding this evidence.
In its Respondent’s Brief, the State contends Mr. Chambers failed to preserve arguments
related to his constitutional right to present a defense and Idaho Rule of Evidence 412 (“IRE” or
“Rule”). Mr. Chambers files this Reply Brief to address the State’s argument regarding
preservation of issues, and provide additional clarification regarding Rule 412.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Chamber’s Appellant’s Brief. They are incorporated herein by reference thereto.

1

North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
Mr. Chambers’ oral and written motion, which included a several-page police report of the
subsequent incident between Mr. Chase and the complaining witness in this case, N.S.,
incorporated a request to introduce not only evidence of a false allegation of rape made against
Mr. Chase, but also N.S.’s destruction of evidence, N.S.’s report to the police, the circumstances
surrounding her relationship with Mr. Chase, and other corroborating evidence. Therefore, while
Mr. Chambers may refer to this evidence collectively hereafter as “evidence related to N.S.’s
false allegation” for brevity sake, Mr. Chambers preserves, and in no way restricts, his motion to
admit this broad-based evidence.
2

1

ISSUE
Did the district court err by excluding evidence related to N.S.’s subsequent claim of rape against
Mr. Chase?

2

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred By Excluding Evidence Related To N.S.’s Subsequent Claim Of Rape
Against Mr. Chase

A.

Mr. Chambers Preserved This Issue For Appeal
The State asserts Mr. Chambers did not fully preserve his argument for appeal because he

failed to argue in the district court that exclusion of the evidence would violate his constitutional
rights or that the proffered evidence did not fall under the purview of Rule 412. (Resp. Br., p.5.)
“Appellate court review is limited to the evidence, theories, and arguments that were presented
below. Issues not raised below generally may not be considered for the first time on appeal.”
State v. Armstrong, 158 Idaho 364, 367 (Ct. App. 2015) (citations omitted). The appellant
“cannot argue more grounds for that challenge [to a search] than were argued before the district
court.” Id. Mr. Chambers did in fact properly preserve his arguments, as his written pleadings
and oral arguments adequately incorporated the substantive arguments he raised on appeal.
On May 9, 2017, Mr. Chambers filed a Motion to Allow Specific Instances of the
Alleged Victim’s Past Sexual Behavior pursuant to Rule 412. (R., p.129.) In that motion,
Mr. Chambers moved for an order “allowing specific instances of the complaining witness’s past
sexual behavior to be admitted at trial pursuant to I.R.E. 412,” specifically referring to the
information contained in Coeur d’Alene police report 16C39767. (R., p.129.) Mr. Chambers
attached the police report as an exhibit, which described N.S.’s false claim of rape against
Mr. Chase, N.S.’s report to the police, her destruction of evidence prior to that notification, and
corroborating evidence demonstrating that her claim was false. (R., pp.131-143.) In response,
the State filed a motion to exclude pursuant to IRE 412(b)(2)(C), and supported that motion with
a memorandum contending that evidence of a false allegation of a sex crime is controlled by IRE
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412(b)(2)(C), and that a trial court’s determination as to admission should be subjected to a Rule
403 analysis. (R., pp.148-152.) These written arguments were augmented at the hearing on the
motion.
During the hearing, the State’s argument was confined to the following: “basically, I
think you’re gonna have an issue here with unfair prejudice. And if the Court isn’t satisfied by
that factor, I think the issue that’s – this factor, if it’s allowed at trial, could create just a mess.
Basically confusing the issues. Another trial within a trial. The sort of things that, you know, I
think IRE 403 is designed to prevent.” (Tr., p.33, Ls.4-12.) Conversely, Mr. Chambers argued
generally that the evidence was relevant and admissible under Rules 412 and Rule 404, and that
admission of such evidence was necessary for him to present a defense and effectively confront
and cross-examine his accuser. Counsel stated:
Thank you, your Honor. Well, I agree with Mr. Verharen that his brief is
fairly self-explanatory. One of the problems, though, that I wanted to point out is
that the relevance of the items described in the police report is not for
impeachment.3
You know, as you look at 412, just the rule standing on its own, it lists a
specific category of prior false accusations of sex offenses. Now, the reason for
that make a lot of sense. It’s kind of a specialized 404(a) or 404(b). A person
who would do that, it’s such – it’s such unusual extraordinary human conduct that
a person would do that once, you know it makes it more likely this is the kind of
person who would do it again.
This is a case where everything in is in dispute. You know the State lists
that there was a confession but we’re stating it is a false confession. . . . so when
you go to relevance, when you have a he said/she said instance and when you
have evidence that indicates that this is a person who is prone to make false
allegations, it’s very relevant. It’s highly relevant.

3

Although the transcript reads here that counsel stated the evidence was not for impeachment,
Mr. Chambers submits this may be an inadvertent misstatement, as counsel’s argument as a
whole, indicates he did actually argue relevance under credibility and impeachment grounds.
4

With respect to the assertion that this happened after the alleged offense
and therefore it doesn’t fall into the category of the earlier offenses, I want to
point the Court to 412(d) and I’ll read that into the record . . .
Now, as you look at that term, it doesn’t denote – you know it could have
said, “prior to the offense conduct in question, the alleged offense conduct,” but
that’s not really how this rule is meant to be read. The rule is meant to be read as
we stand here today, as we stand before a jury. This is prior conduct that certainly
bears on whether or not she’s made a prior false allegation.
. . . it’s highly, highly, highly relevant. I think that it also invokes the
defendant’s constitutional right to present a defense and to confront
witnesses against him.
Finally, Your Honor, there’s nothing in 412 that forbids this evidence.
Instead it has a specific category for this evidence to be allowed which is a prior
false allegation. To that – and we have officers who could be called who would
testify as to the nature of the allegations, the fact that in that case, like this case,
she deleted these texts which, you know, is a crime. It’s destruction of evidence
in a criminal case.
(Tr., p.33, L.14 – p.36, L.7.) (emphasis added.) By virtue of his language and argument,
Mr. Chambers’ counsel sought admission of not only the false allegation N.S. made against
Mr. Chase, but that she also sent nude photos and texts, that she destroyed this evidence prior to
calling the police, that this evidence was relevant to consent and impeachment and to show a
common plan or scheme due to the similarities between her report against Mr. Chambers, that
the rule is meant to be read temporally as to the time of trial as opposed to the past, that N.S. has
a habit of making false allegations, and that there are other witnesses who could corroborate that
the relationship with Mr. Chase was consensual.
Lastly, Mr. Chambers argued exclusion would violate his constitutional rights. Thus,
Mr. Chambers sufficiently raised the substantive issue of admission under Rules 404 and 412, as
well as his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments rights. The State posits Mr. Chambers waived
these issues yet fails to acknowledge the clear language advanced in the oral and written motion.
In his Appellant’s Brief, Mr. Chambers merely provided additional legal support and argument
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for these substantive arguments, which is permitted upon review. Meanwhile, the cases cited by
the State do not support its argument.
In State v. Norton, 134 Idaho 875, 880, 11 P.3d 494, 499 (Ct. App. 2000), the defendant’s
trial court theory against admissibility was the “best evidence” rule whereas on appeal, he argued
lack of foundation. Mr. Chambers situation is dissimilar because he did not raise a completely
new argument like in Norton. In State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271 (2017), the State
attempted to justify for the first time on appeal that defendant’s detention was lawful under the
4th Amendment even though the State never asserted this in district court. The Idaho Supreme
court rejected the State’s last-ditch effort to justify the constitutional violation. Id. at 275. In
State v. Hoskins, No. 45134, 2018 WL 4169337, at *2–3 (Idaho Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2018), review
denied (Oct. 3, 2018), the State once again unsuccessfully attempted to justify the warrantless
search and seizure based upon an exception to the warrant requirement raised for the first time on
appeal. “Because the State did not assert the plain view theory to the district court as an
alternative basis for denying Hoskins’ motion to suppress, we will not address it for the first time
on appeal.” Id. See also Ada County Highway Dist. v. Brooke View, Inc., 162 Idaho 138, 142
n.2 (2017) (explaining that arguments in support of a position on a substantive issue may evolve
on appeal so long as the “substantive issue” was raised below, and therefore ACHD’s arguments
citing to statutory provisions which had not been referenced below were properly made on
appeal). Mr. Chambers did not raise for the first time on appeal a completely new theory like the
aforementioned defendants.
The State’s reliance upon State v. Briggs, 162 Idaho 736 (Ct. App. 2017), review denied
(Nov. 15, 2017), and State v. Jackson, 151 Idaho 376 (Ct. App. 2017), is equally unsound
because those cases are procedurally distinct. In Briggs, counsel moved in limine to admit the
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sexual history of the victims to show they were sexually involved with individuals other than the
defendant, and that they accused Briggs to protect the actual perpetrators. Briggs apparently did
not brief the issue ahead of time, and initially argued at the hearing that such evidence was
relevant to motive and credibility. Id. at 738. When asked during the hearing whether Rule 412
applied, Briggs argued that it would fall under Rule 412(b)(2)(D), relating to “sexual behavior
with parties other than the accused which occurred at the time of the event giving rise to the sex
crime charged.” Id. The trial court excluded the evidence on the grounds that consent was not
an issue in the case, and therefore allegations about sexual contact between the victims and
others was not relevant. Briggs failed to assert a constitutional right to present the evidence in
question or cross-examine the victims on the matter, or specify any different or additional bases
under Rule 412 to admit the evidence. Id. (“At no point did Briggs articulate that he had a
constitutional right to present the evidence in question, cross-examine the victims on the matter,
or specify any different or additional bases under I.R.E. 412 to admit the evidence.”) Therefore,
when Briggs expanded his argument on appeal to encompass the Sixth Amendment or Rule
412(b)(1), the reviewing court rejected his claims because his trial court claim was narrowly
construed as a statutory basis under Rule 412(b)(2)(D) as opposed to a constitutional basis. Id. at
739.
In Mr. Chambers’ in limine hearing, unlike Briggs’ counsel, Mr. Chambers’ counsel did
raise a Sixth Amendment constitutional basis for admission and several statutory and rule-based
reasons, i.e., Rule 412 generally, Rule 412(b)(2)(D) specifically, and Rule 404(b).

Since

Mr. Chambers raised both constitutional and statutory grounds for admission, unlike Briggs and
the defendant in Jackson, any comparison to this line of cases is flawed due to the procedural
distinctions. Arguments for admission or exclusion of evidence are not mutually exclusive to

7

statutory bases or constitutionally bases. Mr. Chambers raised both of these grounds and the
State’s contention should be flatly rejected.

B.

The District Court Erred By Inserting A Temporal Requirement In Rule 412(b)(2)(C)
The State’s second contention is that Rule 412(b)(2)(C) contains a temporal requirement

which properly resulted in the exclusion of the evidence related to N.S.’s claim against
Mr. Chase. The crux of the State’s argument is that the rule is ambiguous because “earlier time”
is capable of two interpretations, and the only interpretation that gives proper meaning is one
which interprets “earlier time” to mean prior to the charged crime. (Resp. Br., pp.11-12.)
Mr. Chambers contends that Rule 412(b)(2)(C) is not ambiguous, and is capable of proper and
logical interpretation on its face, rendering further analysis unnecessary; further, that the district
court abused its discretion through its erroneous interpretation and application.
Statutory interpretation always begins with the literal words of the statute. The words are
given their plain, usual and ordinary meaning, the statute is construed as a whole, and if the
statute is not ambiguous, a court does not construe the statute but rather and simply follows the
law, State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362 (2003) (citations omitted). Here, however, since the
district court was interpreting a court rule, a slightly modified standard applies:
We are not constrained by the constitutional separation of powers when
interpreting rules promulgated by the Court. Today we make it clear that while the
interpretation of a court rule must always begin with the plain, ordinary meaning
of the rule’s language it may be tempered by the rule’s purpose. We will not
interpret a rule in a way that would produce an absurd result. Instead, in keeping
with the Idaho Criminal Rules’ aim of “provid[ing] for the just determination of
every criminal proceeding.” I.C.R. 2(a), we construe the rules “to secure
simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration and elimination of unjustifiable
expense and delay.” Id.
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State v. Montgomery, 163 Idaho 40, 44 (2017). Had the district court applied this standard, it
would not have determined the false allegation had to occur prior to the conduct involving
Mr. Chambers in order to be admissible.
As asserted in Mr. Chambers’ Appellant’s Brief, the word, “earlier” has an everyday and
ordinary meaning. “Early” means “near the beginning of a period of time, or beginning of a
course,

process

or

series;

sooner

than

related

forms.

See

https://www.merriam-

webster.com/dictionary/earlier (last accessed June 12, 2018). “Earlier” is an adverb, modifying
the noun “time,” and is synonymous with ahead, before, formerly, previously. Id. A false
allegation made at an earlier time means a false allegation made prior to the present, or in the
context of this motion, prior to the motion hearing. There is no other language within the section
as a whole which places a restriction as to when the false allegation must have been made in
order to be admissible against a complaining witness. See IRE 412, generally. There was no
occasion for the district court to insert language or meaning into an already clear statute. Even
assuming the district court took into consideration the purpose behind Rule 412, it would have
determined admission was proper.
As argued in Appellant’s Brief, the purpose behind rape shield law is to provide privacy
protections to alleged victims and encourage them to participate in the legal process.

See §

32:1.Introduction, 4 Wharton’s Criminal Evidence § 32:1 (15th ed.) (fn., quoting the Advisory
Committee Notes to the 1994 Amendment to Fed. R. Evid.412.); State v. Molen, 148 Idaho 950,
954 (Ct. App. 2010). Applied in this context, the false claim of rape and conduct engaged in by
N.S. with Mr. Chase proffered by Mr. Chambers relates to her credibility, and there is no real
risk that a jury, upon hearing the same, is going to engage in sexual stereotyping of N.S. given
the conduct relates to a relationship with one man. Common sense also dictates that a false claim
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of rape, on its face, is relevant to credibility. There is no known Rule 412 purpose or overriding
policy rationale to suggest that credibility concerns of the star witness become at some point
irrelevant in the context of criminal guilt or innocence, and interpretation of Rule 412 under
Mr. Chambers does not lead to an absurd result.
The State makes a new argument on appeal that Rule 412 was recently amended,
effective July 1, 2018, and that such amendment provides support under an ambiguous rule
theory to clarify the drafters’ intent and supply a more precise meaning, where “false allegations
of sex crimes made at an earlier time” became with the 2018 amendment “an alleged victim’s
prior false allegations of sex crimes made at an earlier time.” (Resp. Br., p.12.) Yet the word
“prior” before “false allegation” does not add a temporal requirement as to when the false
allegation must have occurred, other than prior to trial. And any benefit should be afforded to
Mr. Chambers, rather than the State. See State v. Jones, 151 Idaho 943, 947, 265 P.3d 1155,
1159 (Ct. App. 2011) (“The rule of lenity requires that ambiguous criminal statutes should be
read narrowly and be construed in favor of the defendant.”)
Lastly, the district court decision was based upon a different and faulty reason, and
reference to non-instructive subsections within IRE 412 and Federal Rules of Evidence 412.
(Tr., p.36, L.15 – p. 38, L.21.) Specifically, the court indicted that it searched for Idaho appellate
cases defining “past sexual behavior” but did not likewise indicate it searched for “false
allegations made at an earlier time.” The district court also discussed consideration of the federal
rules’ definition of “past sexual behavior,” yet the federal rule does not contain the phrase “past
sexual behavior” to enable a comparison. (Tr., p.37, Ls.6-14.) It is unclear how reference to
FRE 412 could be instructive.4 Further, the trial court failed to conduct a proper weighing under

4

Federal Rule of Evidence 412 states in pertinent part:
10

Rule 403, by contemplating the effect of exclusion on Mr. Chambers’ constitutional rights,
including those of confrontation, cross-examination, presentation of a defense and due process
and a fair hearing. (Tr., p.37, L.15 – p.38, L.21.) As such, the district court abused its discretion
by failing to apply the applicable legal standard, and unreasonably omitting any analysis
regarding defendant’s interests and right to present a defense.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Mr. Chambers requests this Court to vacate the district court’s
order excluding the evidence related to N.S.’s false claims of rape against Mr. Chase, and
remand the case to the district court with instructions to admit the proffered evidence.
DATED this 10th day of December, 2018.

/s/ Lara E. Anderson
LARA E. ANDERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

(a) Prohibited Uses. The following evidence is not admissible in a civil or criminal proceeding
involving alleged sexual misconduct:
(1) evidence offered to prove that a victim engaged in other sexual behavior; or
(2) evidence offered to prove a victim’s sexual predisposition.
(b) Exceptions.
(1) Criminal Cases. The court may admit the following evidence in a criminal case:
(A) evidence of specific instances of a victim’s sexual behavior, if offered to
prove that someone other than the defendant was the source of semen, injury, or other
physical evidence;
(B) evidence of specific instances of a victim’s sexual behavior with respect to the
person accused of the sexual misconduct, if offered by the defendant to prove consent or
if offered by the prosecutor; and
(C) evidence whose exclusion would violate the defendant’s constitutional rights.
11
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 10th day of December, 2018, I caused a true and
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DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
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